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I Comments ]
Ukraine: Not Putting Itself on the Right
Track for MAP?
Kate Klunk*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991, Ukraine gained its independence from the Soviet Union
and set out on a path toward democracy and freedom.' As a struggling
new democracy in Europe, Ukraine was taken under the wing of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO").2 Throughout its working
relationship with NATO, Ukraine has made strides towards forming a
democratic government and a free market economy.3 In 2002, Ukraine
set forth a goal to one day become a member of the NATO Alliance.4
Most recently, Ukraine has petitioned NATO to create a Membership
Action Plan ("MAP"), which is the last major step in gaining a
* bio
1. See NATO Handbook, p. 219, (2006), [hereinafter NATO Handbook 2006],
available at http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2006/hb-en-2006.pdf.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 220.
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membership invitation to join the NATO Alliance.5 While Ukraine has
achieved great successes in areas of reform, NATO has agreed that
Ukraine needs to implement more reforms before Ukraine can become a
NATO member. 6 After the December 2008 meeting on Ukraine's MAP
application, NATO tasked Ukraine and former President Viktor
Yushchenko and his administration with devising a strategy for
implementing its reform goals for 2009. 7 Since 2008, Ukraine has faced
great economic and political challenges. 8 Ultimately, Ukraine needs to
decide if it wants to move forward with pro-western policies of
democracy, free markets, and military cooperation, or if it prefers
aligning itself with Russia. If Ukraine decides that strong ties with
NATO is beneficial to its long-term success and security, Ukraine will
need to complete its NATO homework to help put it back on track for a
MAP.
Part II of this Comment describes NATO's goals, NATO's
structure, and the pathway for a country to obtain an invitation to NATO
membership. 9  Part III details the history of the NATO-Ukraine
relationship, while discussing current events surrounding NATO's
decision to deny Ukraine a MAP. 10 Part IV analyzes the benefits and
drawbacks of inviting Ukraine to become a member of NATO and the
reasons why Ukraine has been denied a chance at a MAP.11 Ultimately,
this comment concludes that despite Ukraine's ability to show it has
accomplished meaningful reforms, many additional reform goals need to
be met in order for NATO to feel comfortable with extending a MAP
invitation to Ukraine, as well as extending an eventual invitation to join
the NATO Alliance. 2 In the coming months and years, Ukraine's
relationship with NATO hinges on President Viktor Yanukovich's
political ideology and decisions as well as the will of the Ukrainian
people. 13 If Ukraine decides that maintaining strong ties with NATO is
5. See Press Release, NATO, Joint Statement at the Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine
Commission at the level of Heads of State and Government (Apr. 4, 2008), [hereinafter
NUC Meeting Bucharest], available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-05 1 e.html.
6. See Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Volodymyr Ogryzko, Following the Meeting of
the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Foreign Ministers Session, (Dec. 3, 2008)
[hereinafter Scheffer], available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s081203f.html.
7. See id.
8. See infra Part II.G.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See infra Part V.
13. See id.
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beneficial to its long-term success and security, Ukraine will need to
complete its NATO homework to help put it back on track for a MAP. 
14
II. NATO-BACKGROUND AND PATHWAY TO MEMBERSHIP
A. Creation of NA TO-Its Goals and Purpose
NATO is an alliance of twenty-six countries' 5 from North America
and Europe. 16  NATO is committed to upholding the goals and the
mission of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on April 4, 1949 in
Washington, D.C. ("North Atlantic Treaty").' 7 The NATO Alliance
came into being after the end of World War 11.18 At the beginning of the
Cold War, countries of Western Europe and North America believed that
military and economic support and cooperation was necessary to prevent
more nations from falling under the Iron Curtain of Soviet
Communism.' 9 To respond to the threats posed by the Soviets, leaders
of original twelve nations20 signed the North Atlantic Treaty. Under the
North Atlantic Treaty, the signatory nations agreed to build up their
individual defense systems and band together to resist aggression. 2' The
twelve original countries knew that through the NATO partnership they
could preserve the national sovereignty of each nation through mutual
support.22 Since NATO's inception over sixty years ago, its membership
has more than doubled to twenty-six countries.23
14. See id.
15. See NATO Organization and Structure, http://www.nato.int/structur/index.html
(last visited Feb. 6, 2008).
16. See id.
17. The original North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949 in Washington,
D.C. and is known as both the North Atlantic Treaty and the Washington Treaty. See
NATO, Frequently Asked Questions, [hereinafter FAQ] http://www.nato.int/issues/faq/
index.html#A1 (last visited May 9, 2010.
18. See Lord Ismay, Former Sec'y Gen. of NATO (1952-1957), NATO: What it is
and how it works, Lecture before the Royal United Serv. Inst. [hereinafter Ismay], (Nov.
5, 1954) available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/ I954/s l9541105.htm.
19. See id.
20. The twelve original countries to sign the NATO Treaty include: the United
States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal,
Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg. See Carol L. Bowers, NATO Looks to Expand
Membership at Bucharest Summit, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV., Apr. 1, 2008 available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=49430.
21. See Ismay, supra note 18.
22. See id.
23. NATO member states currently include: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. See NATO Member
Countries, http://www.nato.int/structur/countries.htm (last visited May 9, 2010).
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For nearly sixty years, the NATO Alliance has aimed to promote
values of democracy, liberty, the rule of law, and the peaceful resolution
of disputes. 24 Specifically, the North Atlantic Treaty's principle values
include to "live in peace with all peoples and all governments" and "to
safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their
peoples. 25  Additionally, NATO's fundamental goal is to protect the
security and freedom of its member nations through collective decision-
making and defense.26 NATO's cornerstone of the system of "collective
defence" is found in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.27 The result
of this collective defense is a greater sense of stability and security
28
among member countries.
B. NATO Decision-Making
To ensure that the values and goals of NATO are upheld and that
the collective defense and security of NATO is maintained, Article 9 of
the North Atlantic Treaty created the North Atlantic Council ("NAC"),
which serves as NATO's decision-making body.29 Currently, the NAC
is comprised of representatives from the twenty-six member countries.3 °
24. See North Atlantic Treaty, art. 10, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243,
[hereinafter NATO Treaty] available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/
treaty.htm#Art 10.
25. See NATO Treaty, supra note 24, pmbl.
26. See FAQ, supra note 17.
27. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states: "The Parties agree that an armed
attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an
attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs,
each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized
by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so
attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such
action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the
security of the North Atlantic area." NATO Treaty, supra note 24, art. 5.
28. See The NATO Xperience Dialogue and Cooperation: The Benefits of NATO,
[hereinafter Xperience], http://www.nato.int/docu/xperience/uk/21/21.html (last visited
May 7, 2010).
29. Article 9 states: "The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them
shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty.
The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The
Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall
establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the
implementation of Articles 3 and 5." NATO Treaty, supra note 24, art. 9.
30. Under Article 5's system of collective defense, should one member country be
attacked, the other member countries would consider it an attack against all states and
would respond as one united defense force. Collective defense allows smaller nations to
participate in operations that they would normally not be able to execute or financially
afford on their own. See North Atlantic Council: NATO's Key Political Decision-
Making Body, http://www.nato.int/issues/nac/index.html (last visited May 6, 2010).
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These representatives consist of Ambassadors, Prime Ministers, or heads
of state and government.3 '
NATO's decision-making process operates by consensus.32 All
decisions and actions require unanimous approval by all twenty-six
member countries.33 The NATO Secretary General serves as chair of the
NAC and helps facilitate the decision-making process.34  Should one
member country not agree, the issue does not move forward. The NAC
makes decisions on all political, military, and security issues affecting
the NATO Alliance.35
C. NATO Military Structure
Included in the NATO representative structure are military
commanders and troops from member countries that serve at NATO's
military installations throughout Europe and around the world. 36  The
head of NATO's military arm is the Military Committee ("MC"). 37 Each
NATO member country appoints a senior military officer to serve as its
representative to the MC. 38  The MC oversees military policy and
strategy development and implementation for all NATO-led operations
and missions.39 NATO's military command structure is based on the
ideals of multinational force planning and organization.40  NATO
strategic military advisors on the MC plan joint training, joint exercises,
and joint operations among member and partner nations.41 To quickly
respond to problems of instability and insecurity throughout the world
with peacekeeping, humanitarian, as well as defense forces NATO has
created the Combined Joint Task Force ("CJTF") made up of multiple
31. See id.
32. See Consensus Decision-Making at NATO, http://www.nato.int/issues/
consensus/index.html (last visited May 6, 2010).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. To cover the day-to-day decision-making and administrative functions of NATO,
each NATO member country assigns a permanent NATO representative and staff to
represent its interests at the NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. See id. These
NATO representatives meet regularly to discuss the business of NATO and travel to
member and partner countries to carry out the business of NATO. See id. This centrally
located representative system allows for an efficient response to an international crisis
involving a member or partner country, because it does not require summoning country
leaders to travel and convene in Belgium on the issue. See id.
36. See NATO Topics: The Military Committee: NATO's Senior Military Authority,
http://www.nato.int/issues/military-_committee/index.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2009).
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See NATO Military Structure: A New Command Structure for a Transformed
Alliance, (April 2007), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/nms/rms-e.pdf.
41. See id.
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nations and multiple service branches for the execution of specific
tasks.42 Over the past ten years, NATO forces have helped bring
stability to nations all over the world including Bosnia, Kosovo,
Macedonia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Darfur.43
D. NA TO's Response to the Threat of Terrorism and Weapons of Mass
Destruction
In addition to NATO's peacekeeping and military mission, NATO
is transforming its collective security and military capabilities to respond
to the threats of terrorism in the 21st century. 4 During the 2002 NATO
Summit in Prague, NATO launched a modernization process of its crisis
management operation to allow member countries to better respond to
terrorism.45  NATO's crisis management operation, the Partnership
Action Plan against Terrorism ("PAP-T"), allowed for better
coordination of missions among NATO members. 46 To date, the PAP-T
has led to increased cooperation among NATO members and partner
countries in border security, terrorism training, information sharing,
investigating and eliminating terrorist financing, and crisis management
preparation for future attacks. 47 Thus far, PAP-T has helped to bring
stability and peace to war torn regions of the world, and has protected
people against terrorism. 48 In particular, NATO member and partner
countries have cooperated in anti-terror operations in Afghanistan and
Bosnia and anti-terror maritime operations in the Mediterranean.49
E. NATO Enlargement: Criteria and Process for Membership
1. Relationships with Non-Member Countries & Expansion
With the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO began deepening its
relationships with non-member countries throughout Europe by setting
up forums to promote dialogue and cooperation among member and non-
member countries.50 NATO saw the end of the Cold War as an
42. See id.
43. See NATO Handbook 2006, supra note 1, at 223.
44. See Prague Capabilities Commitment, http://www.nato.int/issues/prague-
capabilities .commitment/index.html (last visited May 10, 2010).
45. See id.
46. See NATO Handbook 2006, supra note 1, at 205.
47. See id.
48. See NATO Topics: The Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism,
http://www.nato.int/issues/papt/practice.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2008).
49. See id.
50. See Xperience, supra note 28.
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opportunity to spread the ideals of democracy and freedom throughout
former Soviet states in Eastern Europe." l A 1995 NATO Study on
NATO Enlargement, helped NATO realize the possibilities of expanding
these democratic ideals among European states. 52 The study determined
that there was a need to improve security in Europe and extinguish any
political, social, and military remnants of the Cold War that were still
dividing many nations.5 3 Enlarging NATO membership was considered
the best option to enhance security, promote democracy, and foster more
consensus building throughout Europe and the North Atlantic region. 5
NATO's attempts at expansion have succeeded, and NATO is
currently forging new relationships with emerging democracies such as
Ukraine, Russia, countries in the Mediterranean; and countries in the
broader Middle East-including Turkey. 5  Furthermore, NATO is
developing a strategic partnership in the areas of security and crisis
management with the European Union ("EU").5 6 Many countries
partnering with NATO on military, security, or peacekeeping operations
have formed these partnerships to help prove themselves experienced
and capable in these areas in hopes of gaining eventual membership into
the NATO Alliance.57
2. Pre-Membership Process
Before the official NATO membership process begins, countries
aspiring to become members of NATO must complete the following
steps: 1) become a member of the Partnership for Peace (,,pfp,,) 58 ;
2) create an Individual Partnership Action Plan ("IPAP") 59; 3) take part
51. See id.
52. See NATO Handbook 2006, supra note 1, at 185.
53. See id. at 185-186.
54. See id. at 186.
55. See Press Release, NATO, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Approved by the
Heads of State and Government Participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic
Council (Apr. 23-24, 1999) available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm.
56. Most recently, NATO and EU staffers met to discuss piracy and maritime
security issues off the coast of Somalia. See id.; see also North Atlantic Council meets
with Political and Security Committee of the European Union http://www.nato.int/
docu/update/2008/1 1-november/el 124a.html (last visited May 10, 2010).
57. See Road to Riga: Reflecting in Riga, NATO REVIEW (NATO, Brussels, Belg.),
Winter 2006, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue4/english/art2.html.
58. See Press Release, NATO, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic
Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace: Invitation, Issued by
the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic
Council (Jan. 10-11, 1994), [hereinafter PIP Invitation] available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940 11 Oa.htm.
59. See NATO Topics: Individual Partnership Action Plans, (Sept. 10, 2008),
[hereinafter IPAP] available at http://www.nato.int/issues/ipap/index.html.
2010]
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in the Intensified Dialogue Process; 60 and 4) complete a MAP. 61 Even
after a country completes these steps, the country must still wait for all
NATO members to agree on extending it an invitation for membership.
62
a. Partnership for Peace
The first step on the path to NATO membership is joining the pfp. 63
At the 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels, Belgium, NATO launched its
preliminary requirements for the PfP initiative. 64 The PfP program sets
forth a plan for "practical bilateral cooperation between individual
partner countries and NATO.,, 65 The PfP program must be "tailored to
individual needs and jointly implemented at the level and pace chosen by
each participating government." 66  Each PfP country is required to
submit a Framework Document, which lays out the specific goals and
commitments for the PfP country.
67
Once NATO committees assess the goals and capabilities of a PfP
country, the country then creates a Presentation Document which is
voted on by NATO's full body.68 Upon approval of the Presentation
Document, a series of two-year Individual Partnership Program ("two-
year programs") are developed by the PfP country and NATO. 69 These
60. See Press Release, NATO, Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and
Cooperation, Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting
of the North Atlantic Council (July 8, 1997) [hereinafter Madrid] available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081 e.htm.
61. See NATO Handbook, Ch. 3, The Opening Up of the Alliance, The Process of
NATO Enlargement, The Membership Action Plan, (2002), available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/200l/hb030103.htm.
62. See NATO Treaty, supra note 24, art. 10.
63. See PfP Invitation, supra note 58, see also Press Release, NATO, Ministerial
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership
for Peace: Framework Document, Issued by the Heads of State and Government
Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (Jan. 10-11, 1994) [hereinafter
PfP Framework Document] available at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-
95/c9401 10b.htm.
64. See PIP Invitation, supra note 58, see also PiP Framework Document, supra
note 63; see also NATO Topics: The Partnership for Peace, [hereinafter PfP]
http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html (last visited May 10, 2010).
65. See PP Invitation, supra note 58; see also PP Framework Document, supra
note 63, see also PFP, supra note 64.
66. See supra note 65.
67. These commitments by the PfP countries include: political commitments to
preserve democratic societies; to maintain the principles of international law; to fulfill
obligations under the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Helsinki Final Act and international disarmament and arms control agreements; to refrain
from the threat or use of force against other states; to respect existing borders; and to
settle disputes peacefully. See supra note 65.
68. See id.
69. See id.
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two-year programs provide a list of goals and priorities a PfP country
should aspire to achieve over the course of two years. 70 Becoming a PP
country does not ensure eventual NATO membership. However, by
becoming a PfP country, the prospective nation is placed in a position
where it can prove to current member countries that it has the military
and emergency response capabilities to carry its own weight as a possible
future member country.71
For example, PfP countries, including Ukraine have assisted with
NATO-led peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan.
72
These joint operations have improved relations among nations and have
increased acceptance and confidence in the PfP country's military
capabilities. 73  PfP countries also gain a greater understanding of
NATO's complex military structure.74  Ultimately, this helps the
prospective member country better support NATO in future
peacekeeping operations.7 5 After a country has proved itself capable of
supporting NATO-led peacekeeping operations, NATO may invite the
country to work with NATO on the development of an IPAP.76
b. Individual Partnership Action Plan
During the 2002 NATO Summit in Prague, NATO introduced the
IPAP requirement for membership.77 IPAP was created as a means of
opening up relations with countries that are interested in furthering a
stronger political and military relationship with NATO.78 Prospective
member countries are required to develop IPAPs that set out domestic
objectives for the country to work to achieve over a two-year period.7 9
Among these objectives, NATO requires the country to focus its IPAP
efforts on "political and security issues; defense, security and military
issues; public information; science and environment; and civil
emergency planning." 80  Further, IPAP permits countries to receive
tailored advice and assistance from NATO on comprehensive reforms
70. Most of these goals focus on military interoperability and defense, defense
training, improvement of communications and information systems, and crisis
management planning. See NATO Handbook 2006, supra note 1, at 198.
71. See id. at 199.
72. See id. at 199, 233.
73. See id. at 203.
74. See id.
75. See NA TO Handbook 2006, supra note 1, at 203.
76. See IPAP, supra note 59.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
2010]
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focusing on institutional reforms within the prospective member
country.81
The IPAP is not a means of guaranteeing membership into NATO.82
Instead, it is a way to help the prospective member country address
political, security, and emergency planning issues and implement
necessary reforms. 83 The IPAP builds upon the reforms and goals of the
PfP process, but addresses more wide-ranging reforms including political
issues. 84  Once NATO believes the prospective member country has
adequately addressed these reforms, the prospective member country is
invited to begin a process of an Intensified Dialogue.85
c. Intensified Dialogue Process
The Intensified Dialogue process involves an in-depth discussion of
the political, military, economic, and security goals and proposed
reforms of the prospective member country.8 6 The Intensified Dialogue
first began after the 1997 Madrid Summit, when NATO decided, "to
continue the Alliance's intensified dialogues with those nations that
aspire to gain NATO membership or that otherwise wish to pursue a
dialogue with NATO on membership questions., 87 These Intensified
Dialogue discussions are more frequent and are more focused on
assisting the prospective member country with addressing and achieving
the goals set forth throughout the membership accession process. 88 Once
NATO feels comfortable that the prospective member country has
implemented reforms discussed through the Intensified Dialogue, NATO
invite the country to begin the final major step toward NATO
membership, the MAP.
d. Membership Action Plan
The MAP process is the final step of the formal application process
for countries wishing to join NATO. 89 The MAP program, established
during NATO's Washington, D.C. Summit in 1999, builds upon PfP,
81. See NATO Handbook 2006, supra note 1, at 200.
82. See IPAP, supra note 59.
83. See id.
84. See NATO Handbook 2006, supra note 1, at 200.
85. See Madrid, supra note 60.
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
[Vol. 28:4
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IPAP, and Intensified Dialogues.9" A country's creation and
implementation of a MAP does not guarantee a certain timeframe for a
decision on membership, nor does it guarantee eventual membership into
NATO. 91  NATO's grant of a MAP to a country is merely the
continuation of dialogue and an open door to the possibility of
membership. 92
During the MAP process, NATO asks each aspiring country to
identify specific goals and how it intends to achieve them. MAP goals
for reform cover the following issue areas: political and economic
issues,93 defense/military issues, 94 resource issues,
9 5 security issues, 9 6
and legal issues. 97 98 Feedback on the implementation plan of the goals
is typically provided by a team of NATO staff possessing expertise in the
90. See Press Release, NATO, The Washington NATO Summit, Membership Action
Plan (MAP) (Apr. 24, 1999), [hereinafter MAP] available at
http://www.fas.org/man/nato/natodocs/99042460.htm.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. Prospective member countries are expected to use peaceful means to settle
disputes with other nations, commit to rule of law, honor human rights, encourage peace,
maintain friendly relations with neighbor countries, promote economic stability, and
exercise environmental responsibility. MAP also requires prospective member countries
to annually submit information to NATO regarding "the state of their economy, including
main macro-economic and budgetary data as well as pertinent economic policy
developments." Id.
94. Prospective member countries that are involved in the MAP process are
encouraged to "contribute militarily to the collective defense and to the Alliance's new
missions." Id. Throughout the MAP process, NATO provides the prospective member
country feedback on military force structure, resources, and the means for increasing the
ability of integrating their forces with NATO allied forces to increase NATO
interoperability. See id.
95. MAP provides prospective member countries with a framework for the effective
use of budget resources for defense priorities and shows the country how they would be
expected to contribute financially to NATO. See MAP, supra note 90.
96. Countries aspiring for membership within the MAP program are also required
"to have in place sufficient safeguards and procedures to ensure the security of the most
sensitive information as laid down in NATO security policy." Id. Prospective member
countries also need to prove they have the security capabilities to safeguard shared
NATO intelligence and sensitive military and security information should they become a
member of the NATO. See id.
97. Prospective member countries are required to review the various legal
agreements that govem NATO operation and cooperation among NATO member
countries. See id. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that the prospective
member country's constitution, laws, regulations, and pending legislation do not conflict
with any NATO regulations that could hinder that country's integration into NATO's
activities. See id. Some of the binding agreements that new members must agree to
include The North Atlantic Treaty, military agreements, security agreements, agreements
on securing sensitive defense information, agreements on sharing information for defense
purposes, and agreements regarding atomic information. See id.
98. See id.
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particular issue area being addressed. 99  These NATO teams work
closely with the prospective member countries to draft and implement
the MAP. 100 At the annual NAC meeting, the MAPs are discussed and
areas needing improvement are addressed in a report to the prospective
member country. 10 1  The prospective member country then decides
whether to take further action to address NATO's comments to become a
better candidate for NATO membership. 102
3. Invitation & Accession to Membership
Countries wishing to join the NATO Alliance must follow the
process set forth by Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. 103 Article 10
of the North Atlantic Treaty details the process by which countries may
join the NATO Alliance 10 4  First, the prospective country must be a
"European state." 105  Second, the prospective country must be in a
position to uphold the principles 106 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as well
assist in providing security to the North Atlantic region.'0 7 Third, the
prospective country must receive unanimous support for NATO
membership from all current member countries. °8  Finally, upon
unanimous approval for membership, the prospective country is
officially invited to join NATO as a member country. 109
99. See id.
100. See MAP, supra note 97.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See NATO Treaty, supra note 24, art. 10.
104. Article 10 states: 'The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other
European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to
the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may
become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the
Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of
America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of
accession." Id.
105. Only countries located in Europe may become members of NATO. See id.
106. See id. pmbl.
107. See id. art. 10.
108. See NATO Treaty, supra note 24, art. 10.
109. Once NATO members have unanimously agreed to invite a country to become a
member, NATO and the prospective member country engage in a series of talks
regarding future reforms. See id. After an invitation is extended, but before accession,
NATO presents the country with a timetable for reforms that must be met before and
after the accession. See id. Once the country meets the required reforms, the accession
process begins. See id. During the accession process, each NATO member country must
approve the newly invited country's protocol of accession. See id. Once all NATO
members agree to the country's accession, the formal instruments of accession are
drafted, signed, and submitted to NATO. See id. Upon submission of the formal
accession protocols, the country is legally a member of NATO. See id. Once the country
is a NATO member, it is expected to uphold the principles of NATO, financially
[Vol. 28:4
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III. NATO & UKRAINE RELATIONS
For over the past seventeen years, NATO's relationship with
Ukraine has developed into an active partnership with future hopes that
Ukraine will be able to become a full member of the NATO Alliance.' 10
Ukraine is Europe's second largest country 1' and is strategically located
between eastern and western Europe.' 1 2  Ukraine is also bordered by
Russia and four NATO member states: Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and
Romania. 113  As such, Ukraine's partnership and possible future
membership into NATO presents a potential for increased stability in
Europe. 114
A. Ukraine and the Partnership for Peace
NATO recognized the benefits of a relationship with Ukraine and
began formal relations in 1991, when Ukraine joined the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council, now the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
("EAPC"). 5 The EAPC serves as a NATO forum for member and non-
member states to discuss political and security issues. 116  In 1994,
Ukraine became the first former Soviet state to become a member of the
PfP program. 117 Throughout the 1990s, Ukraine proved to NATO its
commitment to PWP peacekeeping operations by contributing support
during NATO's peacekeeping operations in the Bosnia, Herzegovina,
and Kosovo. 118  More recently, Ukraine has shown its support for
fighting terrorism with NATO's PAP-T forces in the Mediterranean
Sea. " 9 Because of its strong commitment to NATO's peacekeeping
operations, NATO decided to further develop its relationship with
Ukraine by establishing a distinctive partnership. 1
20
contribute to NATO operations, and provide military and administrative support to
NATO's security and peacekeeping missions around the world. See id.
110. See NA TO Handbook 2006, supra note 1.
111. See BBC News-Europe--Country Profiles-Country Profile: Ukraine,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country-profiles/1102303.stm (last visited May 10,
2010).
112. See Ukraine Map, http://geology.com/world/ukraine-satellite-image.shtml (last
visited May 10, 2010).
113. See id.
114. See NA TO Handbook 2006, supra note 1.
115. See NATO Handbook 2006, supra note 1; see also NATO Topics: Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council, [hereinafter EAPC] http://www.nato.int/issues/eapc/index.html (last
visited Feb. 11, 2009).
116. See supra note 115.
117. See NA TO Handbook 2006, supra note 1.
118. See id. at 223.
119. See id. at 167, 169.
120. Seeid. at 219.
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B. Establishment of the NA TO-Ukraine Commission
In 1997, Ukraine and NATO further strengthened relations by
signing a Charter for Distinctive Partnership ("Charter"). 12' The Charter
created the NATO-Ukraine Commission ("NUC"), 122 which provides
that NATO countries support "Ukrainian sovereignty and independence,
territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity, and
status as a non-nuclear weapons state." 123  The NUC serves as the
cornerstone for the NATO-Ukraine relationship and provides a means
through which both sides can coordinate security, military,
peacekeeping, and economic activities.124  In particular, NUC helps
assess the progress of goals of the PfP, as well as military and
peacekeeping operations.125  The NUC also helps assist Ukraine in
developing means of implementing the necessary reforms to reach its
goals. 1 26 The NUC joint working groups meet throughout the year to
discuss progress in areas of defense capabilities, economic security,
political stability, crisis management, and security.127 For over eleven
years, the NUC has strengthened the NATO-Ukraine relationship and has
provided a forum through which joint operations and goals for reform
could be discussed.
128
C. Ukraine Partnership Action Plan
Ukraine strengthened its relationship with NATO under the NUC in
May 2002, when then-President Leonid Kuchma announced Ukraine's
goal of eventual NATO membership. 129 During a meeting of the NUC at
the 2002 Prague Summit, the NUC adopted the official NATO-Ukraine
Partnership Action Plan ("Action Plan"). 130 The Action Plan is rooted in
the foundation of the NUC partnership Charter.' 3' The Action Plan's
purpose is to "indentify Ukraine's strategic objectives and priorities in
pursuit of its aspirations for full integration into Euro-Atlantic security
structures and to provide a strategic framework for existing and future
121. See id.
122. See NATO Handbook 2006, supra note 1.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 220.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See NA TO Handbook 2006, supra note 1, at 220.
128. See Press Release, NATO, Joint Statement, NATO-Ukraine Commission
Meeting (July 9, 2007) available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2007/p07-082e.html.
129. See NA TO Handbook 2006, supra note 1.
130. See id.
131. See id.
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cooperation."'' 32  In particular, NATO has urged Ukraine to focus its
reform efforts on "strengthening democracy, the rule of law, human
rights, and the market economy."' 133 To achieve the goals of the Action
Plan, the NUC has established a framework for reporting to NATO on
progress of implementation and reforms twice a year. 134 In these bi-
annual meetings, Ukraine's Annual Target Plans ("ATP") are developed,
which list goals that Ukraine hopes to accomplish on its own, as well as
goals it hopes to accomplish with assistance from NATO. 135 Some of
the goals set forth in the ATPs include economic reforms, judicial system
reforms, and election reforms. 1
36
1. Political Changes, Orange Revolution & Ukraine's Action
Plan
The 2004 Ukrainian Presidential election showed that Ukraine was
in dire need of meeting the election reform goals set forth in its ATPs.
As a part of Action Plan and ATP reforms, NATO called on "Ukraine's
leadership to take firm steps to ensure a free and fair electoral process,
guarantee media freedoms and rule of law, strengthen civil society and
judiciary, improved arms export controls and progress on defense and
security sector reform and the allocation of financial support to its
implementation."' 37  With President Kuchma's term ending, two
candidates entered the race for President, Viktor Yushchenko, a Western-
leaning candidate, and Viktor Yanukovych, a Pro-Russian candidate.
38
Yushchenko, a grassroots campaigner supporting pro-Western, pro-
NATO, and anti-corruption policies, was very popular among younger
voters, voters in Kyiv, and voters in western Ukraine.139 Yanukovych, a
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See NATO Handbook 2006, supra note 1, at 221.
135. Annual Target Plans are the annual supplemental reports to Ukraine's Action
Plan. See NATO Topics: NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-
ukraine/actionplan.html (last visited May 10, 2010).
136. See NATO-Ukraine Annual Target Plan for the Year 2008 (Apr. 2008),
[hereinafter ATP 2008] available at http://www.nceai.gov.ua/download.php?
918b7bI 157c4999056732c7ef64239c0&target - 1.
137. NATO Handbook 2006, supra note I, at 221.
138. See generally Paul Quinn-Judge and Yuri Zarakhovich, The Orange Revolution,
TIME, Nov. 28, 2004, [hereinafter Quinn-Judge] available at http://www.time.com/time/
europe/html/041206/story.html (from the Dec. 6, 2004 issue).
139. In September of 2004, Yushchenko became very ill and after numerous tests was
diagnosed with dioxin poisoning. See generally Quinn-Judge, supra note 138.
Yushchenko gained great support from the Ukrainian people, especially when theories
began to surface that the Yanukovych camp might be involved. See generally Quinn-
Judge, supra note 138; see also Roman Kupchinsky, Ukraine: Mystery Behind
Yushchenko's Poisoning Continues, RADIO FREE EUR., Sept. 18, 2006, available at
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1071434.html.
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Pro-Russian candidate, was supported by many voters in eastern
Ukraine. 1
40
On October 21, 2004, Ukrainians went to the polls to elect their
President; however, neither candidate received fifty percent of the vote
needed to win. 141 The two top vote-getting candidates, Yushchenko and
Yanukovych, then faced off in the November 21, 2004 run-off
election. 142 The November election results were mired in controversy
and many Ukrainians believed the results showed widespread voter
fraud. 143 Many Ukrainians protested the legitimacy of the results during
political demonstrations called the Orange Revolution protests.' 44 The
Orange Revolution was comprised of Yushchenko's "Our Ukraine"
supporters, as well as Parliament member Yulia Tymoshenko's "Power
of the People" coalition. 145  These Orange Revolution protestors
demostrated in the capital at Kyiv's Independence Square by waving
orange flags and banners and setting up tents. 146
The Orange Revolution public protest was a driving force behind
the international observer's request for a re-vote.147 Further, the Orange
Revolution protests also influenced the Supreme Court of Ukraine in
annulling the results from the November run-off and requiring a re-vote
on December 26, 2004.148 After the re-vote in December, Yushchenko
was declared the President of Ukraine and was sworn in on January 23,
2005.149 Since Ukraine took the proper steps to ensure free and fair
140. See Quinn-Judge, supra note 138.
141. Viktor Yushchenko received 39.87% of the vote while Viktor Yanukovych
received 39.32% of the vote. See 2004 Presidential Election First Round,
http://www.skrobach.com/ukrel041.htm (last visited May 10, 2010); see also Quinn-
Judge, supra note 138.
142. See generally Quinn-Judge, supra note 138.
143. Viktor Yushchenko received 46.61% of the vote while Viktor Yanukovych
received 49.46% of the vote. See 2004 Presidential Election Invalid Second Round,
http://www.skrobach.com/ukrel04s.htm (last visited May 10, 2010); see also Quinn-
Judge, supra note 138.
144. See generally Quinn-Judge, supra note 138; see also Orange Ukraine-What
was the Orange Revolution?, http://orangeukraine.squarespace.com/revolution/(last
visited Jan. 26, 2009).
145. Yulia Tymoshenko served as a member of Parliament in 2004. See About
Tymoshenko, http://www.tymoshenko.ua/en/page/about (last visited May 10, 2010). She
supported Yushchenko for President and was elected Prime Minister on February 4,
2005, a position that she held until 2010. See id.
146. See Helen Womack, One Election, Two Viktors. Will Ukrainians Accept the
Results?, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 23, 2004, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1123/pO5sOl-woeu.html.
147. See NATO Handbook 2006, supra note 1, at 221.
148. See Ukraine, 2004 Election, Supreme Court Key Findings in English,
http://www.skubi.net/ukraine/findings.html (last visited May 10, 2010).
149. Viktor Yushchenko won the December election and received 51.99% of the vote
while Viktor Yanukovych received 44.20% of the vote. See 2004 Presidential Election
Second Round, http://www.skrobach.com/ukrel04sa.htm (last visited May 10, 2010); see
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elections in 2004, NATO members expressed their support for President
Yushchenko's reform agenda for Ukraine and agreed to begin an
Intensified Dialogue on April 21, 2005. 150
D. Ukraine's Intensified Dialogue
With a new pro-NATO president in place, NATO agreed to begin
the Intensified Dialogue with Ukraine concerning possible future
membership. 151 In June of 2005, Ukraine presented to the NATO
Secretary General "an initial discussion paper" for the Intensified
Dialogue. 152 This discussion paper highlighted the necessary defense,
security, and legal reforms that Ukraine would need to address to bring
Ukraine closer to NATO membership. 153  This Intensified Dialogue
process provided Ukrainian officials with a better idea of NATO's
expectations for reform and helped identify urgent goals. 154 These goals
were set forth in Ukraine's 2005 ATP and included goals for the
strengthening of democratic and electoral institutions, strengthening
judicial authority and independence, promoting human rights and civil
freedoms, protecting religious freedoms, fighting against money
laundering, and implementing institutional economic reforms.1
55
Through the Intensified Dialogue process, Ukraine and NATO worked
together to formulate and implement these goals. 156  The Intensified
Dialogue processes signaled to Ukraine that NATO members supported
Ukraine's desire to one day become a member of the NATO Alliance.
57
However, this support for NATO membership, will only remain as far as
Ukraine cooperates with NATO on key reform areas.
1. Peacekeeping, Security, and Terrorism Prevention Operations
For nearly fifteen years, Ukraine has served beside NATO
members in PfP NATO-led peacekeeping operations around the globe. 1
58
In particular, Ukraine has provided infantry and helicopter supplies to the
also Peter Finn, In a Final Triumph, Ukrainian Sworn In, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2005, at
A08, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30051-2005
Jan23 .html.
150. See NATO Handbook 2006, supra note 1, at 221-22.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 222.
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. See NATO-Ukraine Annual Target Plan for 2005, available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/other/ukr/target-plan-e.pdf.
156. See id.
157. See NATO Handbook 2006, supra note 1, at 222.
158. See id. at 223.
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NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and
Kosovo. 159 Over 1,600 Ukrainian troops have served in Iraq and even
more troops are fighting terrorists in Afghanistan as part of the NATO-
led International Security Assistance Force ("ISAF"). 160 Ukraine also
assists the international war on terrorism by supporting NATO's
maritime Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean Sea.
161
Ukraine's capability to integrate its military forces with NATO forces for
peacekeeping missions helps prove to NATO that Ukraine would be
capable of supporting future NATO-led missions as a member country.
2. Defense & Security Reforms
To transform its military into a 21st century defense force, Ukraine
has undertaken many reforms with the assistance of NATO. 162 After
gaining independence from the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited an
established armed forces unit. 16 3 Over the years, Ukraine has worked
with NATO in reforming its military to make the transition into a 21St
century defense and security force. 64 To do this, NATO has assisted
Ukraine in transforming its military forces "into smaller, professional,
more mobile armed forces capable of meeting its security needs as well
as contributing actively to European stability and security."' 165 Ukraine
and NATO have also worked improve interoperability and integration of
Ukrainian forces with NATO forces. 166 The Ukrainian military boasts a
total of 191,000 civil servants and military personnel (148,000 military
personnel and 43,000 civilian personnel). 167 These military personnel
assist with PfP peacekeeping missions around the globe. 168  The
Ukrainian military also works together with NATO forces in beginning
the demilitarization process of Ukrainian landmines and other surplus
conventional weapons. 169  Through this joint mission, Ukrainian and
NATO troops have completed the removal of all nuclear weapons within
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 223-24.
162. See NA TO Handbook 2006, supra note 1, at 224-25.
163. See id. at 224.
164. See id.
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. See Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, White Book 2007 - Defense Policy Of
Ukraine, (2008) [hereinafter White Book] available at
http://www.mil.gov.ua/files/white-book/whitebooken2007.pdf.
168. See id.
169. See id.
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Ukraine. 70  Ukrainian demilitarization will be the largest
demilitarization project of its kind undertaken by NATO. 171
3. Legal Reforms
The NUC is also working to address needed legal reforms in the
areas of legal representation, judicial fairness, and human rights. 172 In its
2008 NATO-Ukraine ATP, the NUC aimed to establish a "free-of-charge
legal aid system" to protect the rights to legal representation for indigent
citizens.1 73  Additionally, the NUC hopes to conduct a review of the
current Ukrainian constitution, laws, and other regulations to determine
what legislative reforms are necessary to better align Ukraine's political
system and its laws with the principles of NATO. 1
74
In addition to reviewing the laws of Ukraine, the NUC hopes to
perform a review of the administrative side of the Ukrainian legal
system. 175 The 2008 ATP set goals to strengthen the authority and
independence of the Ukrainian Judiciary system, to counter judicial
corruption, and to strengthen the legal education system. 176 Reforms to
the Ukrainian judicial system are desperately needed, since many
citizens, including many Ukrainian lawyers, believe that the judiciary "is
the country's most corrupt branch of government." 1
7 7
The current Ukrainian court system was established in 2002 with
the help of the European Community, however Soviet influences
remain. 178 Ukrainian judges are elected for a term of life, similar to other
170. Ukraine has worked with international partners in removing all nuclear weapons.
At one time, Ukraine had the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world. See White Book,
supra note 167; see also Press Release, Sen. Richard Lugar, Nunn-Lugar Program
Destroys Hundreds of WMD in 2008, (Jan. 23, 2009) available at
http://lugar.senate.gov/press/record.cftn?id=307173.
171. Ukraine inherited more than seven million surplus small arms and light weapons,
and more than two million tons of munitions from the Soviets. See White Book, supra
note 167. These large weapons stockpiles are dangerous and have caused explosions as
the weapons begin to break down. See id. These stockpiles also present a security risk to
Ukraine and the region. See id.; see also NATO Update: Largest Ever Demilitarization
Project Launched in Ukraine, http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/06-june/e0619a.htm
(last visited May 10, 2010).
172. See ATP 2008, supra note 136.
173. Id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. Anna Melnichuk, Court Corruption and the Urgent Need for Legal Reform, Bus.
UKR., Feb. 25, 2008, [hereinafter Melinichuk].
178. The current Ukrainian court system is comprised of four levels: general
jurisdictional courts, appeals courts and military courts, specialized courts including
commercial and administrative courts, and the Supreme Courts. Additionally, the
Constitutional Court of Ukraine hears cases on legislative and constitutional issues. See
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European countries and the United States; however, in Ukraine the
judges have not had a strong tradition of following the law. 179  In
response to this widespread judicial corruption, then-President
Yushchenko, created a Judicial Reform Commission to develop and
promote a strategic plan to improve accountability among the judicial
branch and provide a fair court system.' 80 Ukraine also plans to further
reform the judicial system by adopting a criminal procedure code and an
administrative code.' 81
In addition to the many institutional legal reforms, the NUC has set
goals to address general corruption among the public, to fight organized
crime, and to stop money laundering and terrorist financing.' 82 To better
investigate these crimes, Ukraine is conducting monitoring operations
over financial transactions to better track money laundering and financial
terrorism. 183 To better prosecute and punish individuals for these crimes,
Ukraine has established goals to amend criminal acts to increase
penalties and responsibilities for corruption activities and has established
a "code of honest conduct" for state and local officials to follow.' 84 In
fighting corruption, the 2008 ATP calls on Ukraine to consult with
NATO to "exchange experience in reacting to modem threats to
international security" including "terrorism financing, transnational
crime, and money laundering."' 185 Ukraine drafted a reform-oriented
2008 ATP in hopes of showing NATO that it was serious about reform,
and that it is a strong country that should be considered for a MAP.
E. Public Support for Ukrainian Membership into NATO
To assist the Ukrainian government in gaining support for NATO
membership, NATO has partnered with Ukraine in establishing an
Information and Documentation Centre ("NIDC") in Kyiv. 18 6 The NIDC
helps "to promote the mutual benefits of Ukraine's partnership with
NATO and explain Alliance policies to the Ukrainian public."'' 87 In
addition, the NIDC offers seminars and conferences for the discussion of
the NATO-Ukraine relationship and possible future membership of
179. Conduct of Ukrainian judges is reviewed by the High Court of Justice, which is
comprised of former and current judges. See id This High Court is intended to oversee
disciplinary procedures against judges, but has seen little action, since many judges do
not want to discipline their own. See id.
180. See id.
181. See ATP 2008, supra note 136.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. See NA TO Handbook 2006, supra note 1, at 222.
187. Id.
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Ukraine into the NATO Alliance. 188  The NIDC also assists with
educating the Ukrainian public about the positive military contributions
Ukraine has made to NATO-led peacekeeping and military operations
around the world.1 89 Some Ukrainians, particularly older Ukrainians,
still think of NATO as a Cold War Alliance and are unsure of NATO's
principals and goals moving forward in a post-Cold War world. 190 After
living under Soviet rule for over seventy years, many older Ukrainians
are skeptical of western ideals and institutions like NATO. 191 However,
in light of the Orange Revolution and attempts to educate young
Ukrainians about the abuses of the Soviets, younger Ukrainians are more
supportive of the ideals of freedom and democracy and support
Ukraine's membership into NATO. 1 92 In better educating the Ukrainian
people as to the NATO-Ukrainian relationship, benefits of reforms, and
the military and security benefits of NATO membership, public support
for Ukrainian membership into NATO should grow. 
1 93
This education process is needed in light of poll numbers showing
lagging support for NATO membership. 194  A December 2007 poll
conducted by Ukraine's Democratic Initiatives Foundation showed that
49.4 percent of people polled objected to Ukraine's attempt at joining
NATO, while 15.8 percent supported Ukraine's attempt at joining
NATO. 195 The other 16.1 percent stated that they may approve of the
attempt to join NATO. 196 In a more recent May 2009 Gallup study,
Ukrainians were asked if they saw NATO as a form of protection or a
threat. 97  Only 13 percent of Ukrainians saw NATO as a form of
protection, while 40 percent saw NATO as a threat. 98 These numbers
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See NATO Handbook 2006, supra note 1, at 222; see also Taras Kuzio, Revival
of Stalinism in Russia Shows Gap Between Neighbors, KYIv POST, Dec. 17, 2008,
[hereinafter Kuzio] available at http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/oped/32132.
191. See NATO Handbook 2006, supra note 1, at 222.
192. One of the major Soviet abuses that the Ukrainian government teaches in schools
is the 1933 Great Famine, an artificially imposed famine, which killed over four million
people. See Kuzio, supra note 190.
193. See NATO Handbook 2006, supra note 1, at 222.
194. See Mu Xuequan, Poll: Almost half of Ukrainians Oppose Joining NATO
Membership Action Plan, P.C.R VIEW, Jan. 25, 2008, [hereinafter Xuequan] available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-01/25/content_7491014.htm.
195. The Democratic Initiatives Foundation poll was taken on December 5-12, 2007
and questioned 1,800 people. See id. The estimated margin of error was 2.3 percent. See
id.
196. See id.
197. Julie Ray & Neil Esipova, Ukrainians Likely Support Move Away from NATO,
GALLUP, Apr. 2, 2010, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/127094/ukrainians-
likely-support-move-away-nato.aspx.
198. See id.
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certainly show a need for the NIDC to ramp up education efforts about
the benefits of NATO membership to Ukraine.
F. 2008 Bucharest Summit-Ukraine's First Chance at a MAP Plan
for Membership
Despite lagging poll numbers, Ukraine's leaders decided to request
a green light to begin the MAP process at the April 2008 annual NATO
Summit in Bucharest, Romania.1 99 Before the Summit, President George
W. Bush visited Kyiv and spoke about U.S. support for a MAP plan for
Ukraine.200 In his remarks at the Presidential Secretariat, President Bush
stated,
Ukraine now seeks to deepen its cooperation with the NATO alliance
through a Membership Action Plan. Your nation has made a bold
decision, and the United States strongly supports your request. In
Bucharest this week I will continue to make America's position clear:
We support MAP for Ukraine and Georgia. Helping Ukraine move
toward NATO membership is in the interest of every member in the
Alliance and will help advance security and freedom in this region
and around the world.20
At the Bucharest Summit, Ukraine petitioned NATO for the opportunity
to begin the MAP process, but this request was denied.2 °z Many factors
contributed to this lack of MAP approval including lack of public
support, the need for more reforms, strained political relations among
Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, and possible strained ties with Russia.0 3
After the decision, NATO affirmed its commitment to assisting
Ukraine in its aspirations for membership into NATO.20 4 In a joint
statement after the meeting of the NUC, heads of state and government
declared that they "agreed that Ukraine will become a member of
NATO.' 20 5 Additionally, NATO members expressed their support for
Ukraine and their willingness to work with Ukraine on implementing the
necessary reforms to help Ukraine gain eventual membership into the
199. See NUC Meeting Bucharest, supra note 5.
200. See White House Press Release, President Bush Participates in Joint Press
Availability with President Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine (Apr. 1, 2008), [hereinafter
Bush] available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/04/
20080401-1.html.
201. Bush, supra note 200.
202. See NUC Meeting Bucharest, supra note 5.
203. See Steven Pifer, Ukraine and NATO Following Bucharest, BROOKNGS INST.,
May 6, 2008, available at http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0506_ukraine_
pifer.aspx.
204. See NUC Meeting Bucharest, supra note 5.
205. Id.
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NATO Alliance.2 °6 The joint statement also expressed appreciation for
Ukraine's commitment to reform and the hope that Ukraine will begin
implementing the goals set forth in its 2008 ATP. 207  Finally, NATO
expressed its appreciation for Ukraine's contribution to NATO-led
peacekeeping operations around the world, noting, "Ukraine is the only
Partner that actively supports all NATO-led operations and missions. 2 °8
After the Bucharest Summit, the NUC agreed to meet in December
2008 to further discuss the possibility of Ukraine obtaining a MAP.20 9
NATO tasked Ukraine to continue to implement necessary reforms set
forth in its 2008 ATP to help it achieve its goal of eventual
membership.21 ° Ukraine set out to continue implementing reforms, but
hit some roadblocks imposed by Russia.
G. Post-Bucharest Turmoil
1. Russian Influences in Eastern Europe
As Russia tries to assert its influence in the Eastern Europe,
Ukraine's chances of gaining MAP may decline. NATO members are
becoming wary of Ukraine's ability to protect its own interests vis-a-vis
Russia and are becoming concerned with Russia's increasing presence in
Eastern Europe. 21 1  For example, on August 4 2008, Russia assisted
South Ossetian separatists in their succession from Georgia.2 12 Georgia
responded to the separatists attacks with gunfire, which gave way for
.21Russia's eventual invasion of the South Ossetia region.2 13 Russia's goals
in assisting the separatists were to re-assert itself as a power in the
region, to destabilize the pro-Western Georgian government, to dissuade
NATO from offering membership to Georgia, and to send a message to
Ukraine that NATO membership may lead to a military situation with
214Russia.
In response to Russia's increasing presence in Eastern Europe with
its invasion of South Ossetia, the United States and Poland agreed on
August 20, 2008 to place ballistic missile interceptors in Poland to help
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. Id.
209. See NUC Meeting Bucharest, supra note 5.
210. See id.
211. See Ariel Cohen, The Russian-Georgian War: A Challenge for the U.S. and the
World, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Aug. 11, 2008, [hereinafter Cohen] available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/RussiaandEurasia/wm2017.cftn.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id.
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protect NATO interests. 21 5 Russia saw this action as a provocation, and
on November 4, 2008, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev ordered
Russian missiles to be sent to its military base in Kaliningrad on the
Baltic Sea.2 16 President Medvedev ordered the missiles to be placed
against NATO's borders to counter the U.S.-Poland missile defense
agreement.217 In a sign of a possible reconsideration of its influence in
Eastern Europe, Russia recently suspended its plan to base missiles in
Kaliningrad.218
However, the suspension of the plan to base missiles in Kaliningrad
is likely not a signal that Russia plans to limit its influence in Eastern
Europe. This is evidenced by Russia's January 2009 dispute with
Ukraine over natural gas, which resulted in gas shortages and high gas
prices throughout Europe. 219  Russia accused Ukraine of stealing gas
supplies intended for other European consumers.22 ° Currently, Russia
supplies Ukraine and Europe with a large portion of their natural gas
supplies.221  In response to this current crisis, Ukrainian leaders
negotiated a new ten-year contract with Russia's state-controlled energy
corporation, Gazprom 2  This new contract gave Ukraine a break on gas
prices until January 2010, when it was forced to pay the going market
rate.223 This latest gas shortage crisis has shown that Russia has the
upper hand when it comes to natural gas supplies, and that it is not afraid
to assert control over Ukraine and its fellow European allies.
215. Former U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice stated that the missile defense
system "will help both the [NATO] alliance and Poland and the United States respond to
the coming threats. Missile defense, of course, is aimed at no one. It is in our defense
that we do this." Poland Signs Missile Shield Deal with U.S., available at
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/20/poland.us.missile/index.html (last
accessed May 10, 2010). The capabilities of the missile defense system include
defending against long-range missile threats from as far away as the Middle East. See id.
216. See Tony Halpin, President Dmitri Medvedev Orders Missiles Deployed in
Europe as World Hails Obama, THE TIMEs (London), Nov. 6, 2008, available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article5090077.ece.
217. See id.
218. See Clifford J. Levy, Russia Reported to Revise Missile Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
28, 2009, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/29/world/europe/29
missiles.html.
219. Nearly eighty percent of European gas supplies travel through Ukrainian
pipelines. See Russian Gas To Europe "Blocked, " BBC NEWS, Jan. 13, 2004, available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7826142.stm. Over fifteen countries have suffered
from the cut back in natural gas supplies. See id. Individuals could not heat their homes
and companies could not power their factories. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See AP, Analysis: Ukraine may be Bigger Loser in Gas War, Kyiv PosT, Jan. 19,
2009, available at http://www.kyivpost.com/nation/33739.
223. See id.
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2. Political Turmoil
In addition to having political issues abroad, Ukraine is
experiencing political problems at home. During 2009, President
Yushchenko, Prime Minister Tymoshenko and members of the cabinet
experienced a strained relationship, despite being political allies during
224the 2004 Orange Revolution. This instability and lack of consensus
has led outsiders to question whether Ukraine's leaders can come
together and govern effectively. 225  Because of the power struggle
between President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko,
Ukraine's credibility as a stable democracy and viable future member of
the NATO Alliance remained in question.226
On September 3, 2008, Ukraine's Orange Revolution ruling
coalition of the Yushchenko and Tymoshenko camps broke apart.227
Prime Minister Tymoshenko's supporters left and joined Yanukovych's
opposition party in approving legislation that would limit presidential
powers. 228 In hopes of ousting Prime Minister Tymoshenko and
punishing her for her change of allegiance, President Yushchenko
dissolved Parliament on October 8, 2008 and announced plans to hold a
snap parliamentary election in December 2008.229 In light of the recent
growing economic crisis, Prime Minister Tymoshenko argued that it
would be too costly to fund elections and subsequently blocked all
funding for the elections.
230
Elections for President of Ukraine took place in January 2010.231
232Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, and Yanukovych all ran for the office.The January election resulted in a February 2010 run off between
224. See Sabrina Tavemise, As Ukraine Staggers, Its Leaders Quarrel, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2008, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/l 1/04/world/europe/
04ukraine.html?_r= I &em.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See Ukrainian President Dissolves Parliament, Calls Snap Elections, RuSS.
NEWS & INFO. AGENCY, Oct. 9, 2008, available at http://en.rian.ru/world/20081009/
117604306.html.
228. See id.
229. President Yushchenko can dissolve Parliament if its members fail to form a
ruling coalition. See id. This is a Constitutional power and requires general elections
within sixty days after the Parliament is dissolved. See id.
230. See A Nation Deeply Unhappy, Kyiv POST, Nov. 12, 2008, available at
http://www.kyivpost.com/nation/30896.
231. See Ukraine Presidential Election Heads for a Second Round, BBC, Jan. 18,
2010, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8463949.stm.
232. See id.
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Yanukovych and Tymoshenko, with Yanukovych declared the winner.233
The finger pointing regarding the response to the economic crisis
certainly hurt voter confidence in both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko.234
This behavior benefited the pro-Russian candidate Yanukovych.235
Yanukovych capitalized on the growing feud between Yushchenko and
Tymoshenko, and rightfully "predicted that this year marks Ukraine's
'last Orange winter."'
236
3. Financial Market Crisis
If the political and economic woes continue, Ukraine's goal of
joining NATO in the near future will not become a reality.
Unfortunately, since Ukraine is a newer free market economy, it does not
have the means of passing a large stimulus package.237 The International
Monetary Fund provided Ukraine with $16.4 billion in bailout funds in
October 2008 to help spur the economy and increase credit
availability. 238  These bailout funds did inject some cash into the
economy, but not enough cash since credit lines continue to dry up.
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Since June of 2008, the Ukrainian Hryvnia lost nearly a third of its value
against the U.S. dollar, and the economic outlook for Ukraine is not
looking good.24 ° Ukraine also suffered a set back with the swine flu
outbreak in the fall of 2009241 and also suffered from decreased steel
production, which represents about forty percent of Ukraine's yearly
exports. 242
As the crisis worsened and more Ukrainians lost their jobs,
Ukrainians became more disconcerted with President Yushchenko and
233. See id.; see also Clifford J. Levy, For Kremlin, Ukraine Election Cuts Two
Ways, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/
09/world/europe/09ukraine.html.
234. See Alan Cullison, Rivalry Deepens Ukraine Economic Woe, WALL ST. J., Feb.
6, 2009, at A7, [hereinafter Cullison] available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB 123387574604054371 .html?mod=googlenews.wsj.
235. See Cullison, supra note 234.
236. Yanukovych gained enough support in Parliament to bring about a no-
confidence vote on then Prime Minister Tymoshenko, but ultimately the vote did not
pass. See id.
237. See Tom Lasseter, Will Ukraine follow Iceland into Financial Meltdown?,
MCCLATCHY NEWS, Feb. 6, 2009, available at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/255/
story/61606.html.
238. See Tavemise, supra note 224.
239. See Lasseter, supra note 237.
240. See Cullison, supra note 234.
241. See James Marson, Ukraine Swine-Flu Panic HINJ Crisis of Political Ploy,
TIME, Nov. 6, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/
0,8599,1934946,00.html.
242. See Cullison, supra note 234.
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Prime Minister Tymoshenko's lack of action.24 3 Former President
Yushchenko had approval ratings in the single digits and former Prime
Minister Timoshenko's approval ratings were only slightly higher.2" As
a result, many Ukrainian people may became disheartened with free
market and pro-western principles and looked to pro-Russian Presidential
candidate Yanukovych as their President in 2010.245
H. December 2008 NATO Meeting for MAP Accession
With the political and economic situation in Ukraine worsening,
NATO Foreign Ministers met on December 3, 2008, to discuss the status
of Ukraine's MAP petition.246 At the meeting, NATO agreed to continue
to support the Bucharest decision stating that Ukraine will eventually
achieve membership into NATO.247 During a press conference after the
NUC Foreign Ministers session, then NATO Secretary General, Jaap de
Hoop Scheffer expressed NATO's support and future assistance in
making further reforms in Ukraine to make the way for Ukraine's
progress toward membership.248  The Secretary General expressed
NATO's willingness to strengthen its ties in Kyiv to better support
Ukraine in its implementation of its 2009 ATP. 249 The Secretary General
called on then Ukrainian Foreign Minister Volodymyr Ogryzko to step
up public relations efforts to highlight the benefits of becoming a
member of the NATO Alliance, as well as to dispel rumors and myths
about NATO.25 ° Ogryzko stated that Ukraine would work with NATO
on redrafting its 2009 ATP to achieve NATO goals.25'
In response to a press question regarding a timetable for
membership, the Secretary General stated "No. That's the simple answer
because this is a performance-based process. So you can never answer
that question. 252 Based on this comment from the Secretary General, it
might be a year or many years before Ukraine becomes a member of
NATO. Additionally, this comment shows that NATO can hold up
membership for any number of reasons, no matter how big or small.
Year after year, an aspiring country might have to jump through more
reform hoops in order to please all NATO countries.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See Levy, supra note 233.
246. See Scheffer, supra note 6.
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See Scheffer, supra note 6.
252. Id.
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NATO has sent Ukraine back to the drafting board with its 2009
ATP. Over the coming months and years, Ukraine will have to work
with NATO to continue to make the necessary reforms and increase
public support and understanding about the NATO membership process
in order for it have a better chance at winning over members during the
next meeting 253 on approving its MAP request.
L Election of Yanukovch & Pro-Russian Stance
In February 2010, Ukraine elected a new pro-Russian President
Viktor Yanukovch. 54 In three short months, Yanukovch and his
administration put forth measures to reverse many of the pro-western
policies of the Yushchenko administration.255 In particular, Yanukovch
eliminated Ukraine's commission tasked with preparing the country for
eventual NATO membership.2 56 Yanukovch and his supporters in the
Ukrainian Parliament also approved a thirty year lease renewal for
Russia's Black Sea fleets base in Sevastopol signaling closer ties with
Russia and movement away from military ties with NATO.25 7 The base
deal extended the Black Sea Fleet's presence in the Crimea until 2042 in
258
exchange for discounts on natural gas imports from Russia. 8 Some
members of the Ukrainian Parliament did not approve the Sevastopol
base deal and protested the deal in the Supreme Rada chambers.259
Opposition members threw eggs and smoke bombs on the Rada floor
while citizens protested outside in the streets of Kyiv.26 °
It is clear Ukraine is going through another transition in its political
process. Only time will tell if the pro-Russian policies of Yanukovch
will hold or if another Orange Revolution will take place. Opposition
leaders such as former Prime Minister Tymoshenko, have expressed fear
that Yanukovch is not acting in the best interest of Ukraine and that in
the coming months as Parliament remains in session protestors will take
253. NATO's 60'h anniversary meeting is scheduled to take place on April 3-4 2009
in Stasbourg, France and Kehl, Germany. See Press Release, NATO, Summit Meeting of
NATO Heads of State and Government (Jan. 26, 2009), available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2009/p09-008e.html.
254. See Levy, supra note 233.
255. See Fred Weir, Ukraine-Russia Relations: Why Kiev Made a Dramatic U-Turn
Back Toward Moscow, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 7, 2010, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0507/Ukraine-Russia-relations-Why-
Kiev-made-a-dramatic-U-tum-back-toward-Moscow.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See Russia Today, Video of the Smoke Bomb Egg Fight in Ukraine Parliament,
Apr. 27, 2010, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SfCRyLlyqJI.
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to the streets in Kyiv to protest the pro-Russian policies.26 ' What is clear
is that Sevastopol base deal will not adversely impact Ukraine's
relationship with NATO and that NATO looks forward to continuing its
relationship with Ukraine regarding the plan set forth in 2008.262
Ultimately, however, Ukraine and the Yanukovch government will
determine how much of a relationship Ukraine will have with NATO in
the coming months and years.
IV. UKRAINE & NATO GOING FORWARD--AN ANALYSIS
A. Benefits and Drawbacks of Ukraine Joining NA TO
In analyzing the benefits and drawbacks of Ukraine joining NATO
there are many things to consider. First, as a member of NATO, Ukraine
would benefit from the support of the collective defense. This collective
defense would help decrease Ukraine's overall defense spending and
would increase its overall national security. Secondly, as a member,
Ukraine would finally be able to participate in decisions made by the
NATO Alliance. Since 1991, Ukraine and NATO have had formal
relations; and for over ten years, Ukraine has contributed military assets
to security and peacekeeping operations around the world.263 Currently,
Ukraine is the only non-NATO member contributing to all of the NATO-
led operations around the world.26 4 Having a vote at the NATO
meetings would allow Ukraine to contribute a voice, not only military
and peacekeeping assets. 265 Third, on the home front, membership in
NATO would provide more support for human rights reforms and would
strengthen Ukraine's democratic values. Fourth, on the national stage,
Ukraine would gain a stronger reputation as a military and economic
power. NATO membership would increase investor confidence in the
Ukrainian economy, would help to spur foreign investment in Ukraine,
and would help to strengthen the Ukrainian economy. 6 6 Finally, as a
NATO member, Ukraine could strengthen its position against Russia on
future issues of dispute.
267
However, in light of recent political and economic instability in
Ukraine, bringing Ukraine into NATO may be a great liability to the
261. See Weir, supra note 255.
262. See Rasmussen: Russian naval base deal will not prevent Ukraine from joining
NATO, BSANNA NEWS, Apr. 23, 2010, available at http://bsanna-news.ukrinforrn.ua/
newsitem.php?id= 12964&lang-en.
263. See NATO Handbook 2006, supra note 1.
264. See Scheffer, supra note 6.
265. See supra Parts III.B-D.
266. See supra Part III.G.3.
267. See supra Part III.G.1.
2010]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
stability of the NATO Alliance. There is also a possibility that becoming
a member of NATO would worsen Ukraine-Russia relations. In the past,
Russia has stated that it would perceive Ukrainian membership into
268NATO as a serious provocation. In a speech in Munich in February
2007, former Russian President, and now current Russian Prime
Minister, Vladimir Putin declared that NATO expansion to include
Ukraine "represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of
mutual trust." 269  If Russia responds negatively to Ukraine's
membership, it could worsen relationships in the region; leading to more
disputes over oil and natural gas supplies.
270
B. Why has Ukraine Not Been Offered MAP?
In reflecting on the outcome of the April 2008 Bucharest Summit
and the December 2008 meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers, Ukraine
has received a clear signal that it will eventually become a member of
NATO, should it want to become a member.27' It is unclear when
Ukraine will become a member of NATO, but NATO has made it clear
that it is committed to its eventual membership.272 Ukraine must work to
achieving the goals set forth in the 2009 ATP, so it can show NATO
members it has achieved concrete accomplishments.273 However, in
light of Yanukovich's dismantling of the committee in charge of NATO
relations for Ukraine, the future relationship of NATO and Ukraine
remains in question.274
1. Lack of Consensus Among NATO Members
Many NATO members have expressed full support for MAP
including the United States, Great Britain, Poland, the Czech Republic,
and many of the newer NATO members (many of which were former
Soviet block nations like Ukraine).27 5 Countries that have expressed
reservations about giving Ukraine the opportunity to submit a MAP
268. See Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43 rd Munich Conference on Security Policy,
WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html.
269. Id.
270. See supra Part 111.G. 1.
271. See supra Part III.F.
272. See supra Part III.F.
273. See id.
274. See Levy, supra note 233.
275. See Steven Erlanger, NA TO Duel Centers on Georgia and Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 2008, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/01/world/europe/
01nato.html?ref=-todayspaper; see also Judy Dempsey, U.S. Presses NATO on Georgia
and Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2008, at A8, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/26/world/europe/26nato.html.
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include France and Germany. 276  Both France and Germany are
concerned with political climate in Ukraine as well as the possible
implications of strained ties with Russia should Ukraine become a
NATO member.277 During the December 2008 NATO Foreign Ministers
meeting, the United States suggested the possibility of allowing Ukraine
to bypass the normal MAP process, which was not favored by France
and Germany and a few other members and eventually was tabled.278 All
members did agree to move forward with the Bucharest decision to
assure Ukraine that it will be offered NATO membership at some point
in the future.
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NATO has not set a timetable for Ukrainian membership, and based
on the Secretary General's remarks in December 2008, NATO will not
be setting a membership timeline for Ukraine. 280 Since NATO operates
under consensus, Ukraine's NATO membership might never get traction
if one member state does not think that Ukraine would be an asset to the
NATO Alliance. 281 Ukraine may be waiting for years to create a MAP,
especially if Yanukovch continues to reduce the level of ties Ukraine
keeps with NATO.282
2. Political Unrest
Many NATO members have been concerned with the growing
political unrest in Ukraine, between the pro-west bloc of Yushchenko
and Tymoshenko supporters and the pro-Russian bloc of Yanukovch
supporters83 President Yanukovch must work to strengthen and reform
Ukraine's economic, political, and judicial systems. NATO members
must see Ukraine as having strong political leaders who can work
together on reforms and who want to see strong NATO ties.
3. Low Levels of Public Support
Public opinion polls have shown that a majority of Ukrainians do
not favor NATO membership, a factor that many NATO members have
considered when voting on a MAP for Ukraine.284 Should the political
winds change and a more pro-western President comes into office in the
coming years, the Ukrainian government along with the help of the
276. See supra note 275.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. See supra Part III.F.
281. See supra Part II.B.
282. See Levy, supra note 233.
283. See id.
284. See Xuequan, supra note 194.
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NIDC should ramp up its education campaign highlighting the benefits
of NATO membership. 285 This effort should focus on gaining more
support among younger Ukrainians, as well as educating older
Ukrainians who have misconceptions about NATO left over from the
Soviet era.286 If Ukraine can accomplish this public education goal,
NATO will see that it is taking real action on much needed reforms.
Ukrainians need to see NATO as a means of security and not of a
threat.287
4. Lack of Reforms
Each year, NATO and Ukraine have worked together to identify
political, economic, military, and legal reform goals for Ukraine to
address.288 Over the years, Ukraine has worked to achieve many of these
goals, but more work needs to be done. If Ukraine addresses the goals
set for in the 2009 ATP, it will increase its chances that NATO will
consider its application for MAP at its future meetings. All of NATO's
steps to membership are reform focused, so Ukraine needs to focus on
accomplishing these goals if it is serious about becoming a NATO
member. Even if the political winds do not point toward NATO
membership at this time, Ukraine should still implement these reforms
for the betterment of its own people.
5. Economic Collapse of the Ukrainian Market
NATO's membership process is very reform focused and in light of
the recent global economic crisis, NATO will likely focusing its
membership invitations on countries with stable economies that show a
promise of future economic growth. NATO does not want to add a new
member that cannot pull its financial weight within the NATO
Alliance. 289 Reforms to the Ukrainian financial and banking industries
will help stabilize markets, increase consumer spending, increase
manufacturing, increase employment, and increase consumer confidence.
If the Ukrainian economy re-bounds from the current global crisis,
outside investors will see Ukraine as a good place to invest, which will
further spur economic growth. Finally, if Ukraine makes the needed
economic reforms and the economy re-bounds, NATO will see Ukraine
as a viable future member state that can financially support its weight in
NATO.
285. See NA TO Handbook 2006, supra note 1, at 223.
286. See id.
287. See supra Part ILI.E.
288. See id.
289. See supra Part II.A.
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6. Russian Influences
Russia has greatly influenced Ukraine's chances at gaining a MAP.
Russia's meddling in the Eastern European region whether in Georgia,
the Baltic, or by cutting off gas supplies, has made NATO members
think twice about moving forward with the membership process for
Ukraine. 90 Russia has in part achieved its goal of sending a message to
Ukraine that NATO membership may lead to a military situation with
Russia.291 NATO does not want to make waves in the Baltic or Black
Seas that could bring about an unwanted Russian response. Through
careful negotiation, eventual NATO membership for Ukraine may be
possible. Ukrainian relations with Russia and Ukraine becoming a
member of NATO should not be mutually exclusive. However, if Russia
does not respond favorably to Ukraine's attempts at NATO membership,
Russia could continue to instigate small skirmishes to show that it is still
a force in Eastern Europe. z92 Finally, Russia still exerts influence on
Ukraine as seen in the recent lease extension deal for the Black Sea Fleet
in Sevastopol.293 In the coming months, Ukrainians will either agree
with the Yanukovch administration about strengthening ties with Russia,
or they will act out in protest and demand a return to more pro-western
and pro-NATO policies.294 Only time will tell.
V. CONCLUSION-WHERE UKRAINE GOES FROM HERE
Before NATO will offer Ukraine the option of preparing a MAP,
Ukraine's leaders will need to show NATO that it is a strong democratic
and emerging free market democracy. To get itself back on the NATO
map for a MAP, Ukraine's leaders will need to reconcile their difference
and focus on creating positive political, security, legal, and economic
reforms. NATO is willing to work with Ukraine on achieving the goals
set forth in the 2009 ATP, but NATO cannot do the job alone. Ukraine's
leaders need to sit down at the table and figure out the best ways of
completing their 2009 ATP "homework."
NATO's continual requests for additional reforms may seem
arbitrary and may seem to be a means of putting off Ukraine's
membership to appease Russian interests. However, NATO needs to
protect its own interests of only letting in members that can uphold the
principals of the North Atlantic Treaty and that can carry their financial
weight. A band of countries bound together by a treaty is only as strong
290. See generally Cohen, supra note 211.
291. See id.
292. See supra Part III.G. 1.
293. See Levy, supra note 218.
294. See id.
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as its weakest link. As Ukraine currently stands amidst political turmoil
and economic meltdown, an invitation to NATO membership would
certainly not strengthen the NATO chain, it would only weaken it.
Furthermore, in light of President Yanukovch's dismantling of the
Ukrainian committee in charge of NATO reforms, ties between the
Ukrainian government and NATO may be somewhat strained.
Ukraine needs to decide if it is dropping out of the NATO program
completely, if it will pick and choose how it interacts with NATO, or if it
will get serious about doing its NATO reform homework. If Ukraine
does not continue to implement reforms and restore political and
economic stability, it may never graduate from the Intensified Dialogue
stage to get a MAP. Based on the recent 2010 presidential election, and
the actions of the Yanukovch administration, Ukraine most certainly is
not putting itself on the MAP track for future NATO membership.
Ukraine needs to decide if it wants to move forward with pro-western
policies of democracy, free markets, and military cooperation, or if it
prefers aligning itself with Russia. If Ukraine decides that strong ties
with NATO is beneficial to its long-term success and security, Ukraine
will need to complete its NATO homework to help put it back on track
for a MAP.
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